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I. INTRODUCTION
Long-term relational contracts are widely recognized as posing
special problems for contract law.1 Such contracts are frequently incomplete in some sense.2 Of course, short-term contracts may also be
incomplete, and courts and legislatures have developed various tools
for filling gaps and resolving ambiguities in such contracts, but those
tools may not be well suited to long-term contracts.
If a long-term contract is incomplete and the relationship is expected to continue, the missing terms or ambiguous obligations must
be renegotiated when the situation requires it. Although such renegotiation always presents the possibility that one or both of the parties will attempt to behave opportunistically, whether or not the relationship is vertical, the power to “hold up” the other party is particularly strong in a vertical relationship in which a party has made a
specialized investment.3

* Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. My thanks to my colleague Jim Rossi for organizing this Symposium, to Dean Donald J. Weidner for his comments on an earlier draft of this Article, and to Professors Baker and Krawiec for their
thoughtful and innovative work.
1. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67
VA. L. REV. 1089 passim (1981); Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical Judicial Error, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 749, 751 (2000).
2. As Baker and Krawiec point out, all contracts must be “obligationally” complete to
be enforceable. Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Incomplete Contracts in a Complete
Contract World, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 725, 726 (2006).
3. All contracts present some opportunity for opportunistic behavior, even if they are
short-term and fully specified. A party may behave opportunistically so long as enforcement costs and the costs of delay are sufficiently high and/or reputational costs are sufficiently low. The holdup power involved in specialized investment is (or may be) different in
magnitude and, therefore, in the incentive to behave badly.
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In their article for this Symposium, Incomplete Contracts in a
Complete Contract World,4 Professors Scott Baker and Kimberly D.
Krawiec argue that this holdup power creates incentives for economically inefficient contracting by encouraging both under- and overinvestment.5 They maintain that this problem is best eliminated by
vertical integration—that is, by sole ownership rather than contract.6
However, sole ownership is not always possible; when it is not, they
say, the parties must perforce rely on contract.7 Accordingly, they argue, contract law should seek to approximate the incentives, investments, and production levels that would be reached in an integrated
firm.8

4. Baker & Krawiec, supra note 2.
5. See id. at 731-33. They note, however, that the overinvestment incentive is created by the measure of damages in contract actions when parties have not specified the
level of their joint investment and is not therefore limited to the problem of vertical relationships. See id. at 735-38.
6. See id. at 731-33. According to Baker and Krawiec, sole ownership eliminates the
incentives for under- or overinvestment created by contracts. At some point they suggest
that sole ownership does this by “allocating” bargaining power to the owner. Id. at 733.
I hope it is possible to appreciate their point while quibbling with their terminology,
because I am about to quibble. Human participants in firms may bargain with each other
over the terms of their participation, but owners do not bargain with their physical assets.
Ownership is a substitute for bargaining, not a method for allocating power within a bargaining process.
Baker and Krawiec, like many economists and law professors, look at firms as a “nexus
of contracts.” See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Derivatives, Corporate Hedging, and Shareholder
Wealth: Modigliani-Miller Forty Years Later, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1039, 1062. While this
terminology is useful, it can also be misleading. The primary utility of firms is that they
are a substitute for contracts. In that sense, they are a nexus of not-contracts, at least
when the word “contract” is given its usual legal meaning.
7. Baker & Krawiec, supra note 2, at 731, 733. In fact, however, these are not the
only alternatives. In addition to long-term contracts and vertical integration, parties may
also use (1) short-term contracts bonded by reputation, (2) joint ownership of the process
and output, as in a partnership or joint venture, (3) partial ownership of one by the other,
and (4) cross ownership. More than one method can be used simultaneously, as when a
firm pays a consultant in stock or stock options pursuant to a formal long-term contract.
No one method dominates. RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, The LAW AND
FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 283-84 (2d ed. 1995); see also Ronald J. Gilson &
Mark J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 871, 905 (1993) (arguing that “crossownership reduces the risk of opportunism”).
We do not know very much about why firms use the methods they do, but apparently
the different methods have different cost-benefit tradeoffs that make them appropriate (or
not) in different circumstances. All of the methods must have survival value, or they would
long since have been removed from the menu of options. Their survival value may well depend on the fact that they are not like each other. Thus, any move toward making one
method more like another—such as making a long-term contract more like sole ownership—would be a move in precisely the wrong direction. It is not clear whether that is what
Baker and Krawiec are attempting to do.
8. See Baker & Krawiec, supra note 2, at 735 n.27. Baker and Krawiec recognize
that many vertical contracts do not involve a specialized investment by either party and
therefore do not create more than the usual opportunities for a holdup in the renegotiation
process. See id. at 731.
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To accomplish this, Baker and Krawiec propose a new default rule
for contracts in which one party has made a specialized investment.
This new rule, the “relationship-specific investment” (RSI) default,
would apply when (1) a party gives notice that it is making or has
made a specialized investment which relates to the contract and (2)
the other party consents or at least does not object.9
Briefly, the RSI default is a rule of construction. It directs courts,
when deciding between two conflicting but credible interpretations of
(1) ambiguous language, (2) the content of a missing term, or (3) the
meaning of the background obligation of good faith, to adopt the interpretation proffered by the relationship-specific investor.10 The default applies to every term of the contract, whether or not that term
is significantly related to the investment.11 Parties bargaining in the
shadow of the default, either before formation or thereafter, will
know in advance who is likely to win if the contract is unclear or negotiations break down. That knowledge will affect their bargaining
behavior.12
In this Article, I evaluate Baker and Krawiec’s proposal by first
asking whether, given their definition of a relationship-specific investment, either the parties or the courts will know whether it applies in any given case. I conclude that they will not. Second, I evaluate whether the RSI default, if intelligibly defined and adopted,
would reduce holdups without creating more costs than benefits. I
conclude that it is unlikely.

9. Id. passim. Apparently, the notice need not be formal, or even actual, and may be
given after the investment is made. A post-investment notice would not operate retroactively, but the default would apply to any new terms.
10. See id. passim. I am agnostic on the propriety of calling a rule of construction a
“default rule.” I tend to think that it is not, but contracts scholars are entitled to their own
vocabulary, even if it is unintelligible to those of us who reserve the “default” modifier for
rules that commence with an “unless otherwise agreed” clause.
11. See id. at 728. This apparently means that a party who has made a relatively
small specialized investment would prevail in a dispute involving potential damages that
dwarf that investment’s size.
12. See id. at 728, 734. For this or any contractual default rule to succeed in modifying behavior, the parties must be rational actors. It is unclear to me why the parties are
presumed to be smart enough to reason back from the impact of a default rule but too
dumb to protect themselves in the contract itself. See generally Eric A. Posner, Economic
Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829
(2003). In this connection, I note that although Baker and Krawiec say they assume rational actors, their hypothetical examples of the RSI in action all seem to involve parties
who are so cognitively impaired that they are either insane or about to sprout leaves.
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II. DEFINING THE PROBLEM
A. What Do (Most) Economists Mean by a Relationship-Specific
Investment?
The particular problem with long-term vertical contracts that
Baker and Krawiec are attempting to solve (or at least ameliorate) is
the incentive for opportunistic behavior13 created by specialized investment.14
To see why specialized investment is a problem, and with apologies to those readers who are already familiar with the literature, the
time has now come for some economics jargon: specialized investments create appropriable quasi-rents that provide an incentive for
opportunistic behavior.15 In their classic article, Benjamin Klein,
Robert Crawford, and Armen Alchian define the appropriable “quasirent value” of an asset as the difference between its value in its current, contracted-for location and use and the higher of its salvage

13. See Baker & Krawiec, supra note 2, at 738. In the transactions costs literature,
opportunistic behavior is generally defined as the unilateral attempt by one party to
change the terms of a bargain after it has been struck. See, e.g., Jonathan Klick et al., Incomplete Contracts and Opportunism in Franchising Arrangements: The Role of Termination Clauses (Jan. 9, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author); see also
Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co., Inc. v. River Valley Cookies, Ltd., 970 F.2d
273, 281 (7th Cir. 1992) (characterizing opportunistic behavior as “behavior designed to
change the bargain struck by the parties in favor of the opportunist”). As noted earlier,
every contract, after formation but before complete performance, presents some possibility
of opportunistic behavior, if only because enforcement costs are more than zero. See supra
note 3.
Baker and Krawiec appear to be using the term much more loosely. “Opportunism” in
their lexicon is sometimes just a synonym for bad behavior, and bad behavior in turn is
any departure from joint profit maximizing—including, perhaps, the rational pursuit of
self-interest by engaging in distributive bargaining. This is particularly puzzling given
their explicit reliance on the agency costs literature, which focuses on ex post opportunism.
They correctly observe that opportunism costs and agency costs may usefully be viewed as
two different terms for the same phenomenon, divided only by a firm’s boundary. Both in
turn are subsets of the general problem of moral hazard. Agency costs, however, do not
arise before the firm is formed.
The difference between Baker and Krawiec’s definition of opportunism and the more traditional use of that term is not merely semantic. If courts are to be directed to distinguish between contracts that present the possibility of opportunistic behavior and those that do not,
they must have a definition of opportunism that explicitly links it to specialized investment.
The risk of ex post opportunism can furnish that link, although it remains to be seen whether
a default rule is best suited to deal with that risk. More generalized notions of “nonjoint profit
maximizing behavior” have no obvious link to specialized investment.
14. In a somewhat different context, Baker and Krawiec have noted that the choice of
a default rule for incomplete contracts should depend on the source of the incompleteness.
See Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Penalty Default Canon, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 663, 666-67 (2004).
15. This is not, of course, the only incentive. For example, market concentration is another potential source of holdup power. If the price mechanism is subject to rigging, then
purchasers of a product subject to the rigged price may prefer building the product to buying it. This sort of holdup, however, is not subject to the RSI default.
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value (if it must be moved) or its value to an alternative user (if it
can remain in place).16
For quasi-rents to be worth appropriating, the size of the disparity
between the contract price and the alternative use must be substantial. If an asset has multiple possible buyers or users at about the
same price, either the owner of the asset will find a new contract
partner or the prospective buyer or user of the asset will find someone else to take over the obligation. Further, even if market conditions have changed so that alternative contracting partners cannot
be found at the same price, no unusual holdup power is present if the
asset’s owner can cheaply transact at a lower price and then sue the
other party for damages.
What gives contracts involving a specialized investment their particular bite is the absence of readily available market alternatives.17
Thick markets require at least semistandardized products, and standardization is the opposite of specialization.18 Thus, appropriable
quasi-rents are created not by the costs of an investment but by a
combination of the costs of disinvesting, the costs of monitoring, and
the costs of enforcement.
In this focus on the quasi-rent created by specialized investment,
however, it is easy to overlook the fact that the absence of a market
alternative creates mutual holdup power precisely because neither
party to the contract can easily substitute an unrelated party’s performance. If no one else is buying a customized good, then no one else
is selling it either.
To demonstrate this mutual holdup power, Klein, Crawford, and
Alchian hypothesize a printing press manufactured and owned by A
and rented by B, a publisher.19 A will do the actual printing for B,

16. Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. L. & ECON. 297, 298 (1978).
17. It is quite important to differentiate between a specialized investment and an ordinary reliance expenditure. Many parties make reliance expenditures, but if those expenditures can be easily recouped in a market transaction, there is no particular holdup power
associated with them.
18. Mobility may also be a factor. Even a noncustomized asset, once fixed in a specific
location, may cost a great deal to dismantle and move. Klein et al., supra note 16, at 324.
The amount of appropriable quasi-rent in such a case will depend on moving costs.
19. Id. at 298-99. Their printing press example may be technologically out of date, but it
serves to illustrate the problem. Klein et al. (and Baker and Krawiec) also use the real-world
acquisition of Fisher Body by General Motors, a merger whose purported reasons have assumed the status of near-myth. Id. at 308-10. However, as Baker and Krawiec note, several
comparatively recent studies of the Fisher-GM merger have cast doubt on that myth. Baker
& Krawiec, supra note 2, at 732 n.19. I suspect its major utility is therefore to serve as an
example of the difficulty in recognizing a holdup when it is argued one exists.
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and A will also pay the operating expenses.20 Once the press has been
customized for B, it cannot easily be used by someone else.21
B, the publisher, knows this, and therefore has an incentive to
“renegotiate” the contract terms, seeking a lower rent once the press
has been customized and installed.22 If there is another publisher, C,
willing to rent the press, but only at some lower amount, then B may
attempt to reduce the agreed-upon rate to that amount, knowing that
A has no choice but to give in if A finds litigation too costly an alternative.23
However, A is not the only one facing a potential holdup. B, the
publisher, needs that press and needs A to operate it. If B is trying to
publish on a regular schedule, then A can try to increase the rent, either in absolute terms or by reducing the quality of A’s services,
knowing that B’s business cannot quickly be transferred to another
press owner. A’s ability to extort B is capped only by the dollar
amount of losses to which B would be exposed by a delay. Further, it
may be quite difficult for B to detect an expropriation which takes
the form of reduced services; at the very least, B would have to engage in costly monitoring and then, if necessary, costly litigation. All
things considered, it might be better for B to own and operate its own
press or for A to own and operate its own publisher.24
Thus, the relationship between A and B is one of mutual dependence. Either party may attempt to appropriate the quasi-rent created
by specialized investment and specialized need;25 it is not a one-way
street.26

20. Klein et al., supra note 16, at 299.
21. Id. at 298-99.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. Then again, it might not. Printing press companies do not generally rush out to
buy publishers; the economies of scope apparently do not outweigh the costs of the quite
different management competencies involved. Whether, in fact, publishers own and operate their own presses apparently depends on the kind of publishing; newspapers, with high
costs of delay, usually do own their presses, while book publishers, whose schedules are
more flexible, frequently do not. Klein et al., supra note 16, at 301 n.6.
25. That mutual dependence also sets some constraints on the amount of the otherwise possible appropriation. Self-interest, even if untrammeled by concerns for reputation,
might induce a party to pluck the golden goose, but only a fool would kill it.
26. The RSI default ignores this essential mutuality. If both parties are making RSIs,
Baker and Krawiec claim the default would not apply; they are currently working through
what should happen in that circumstance. See Baker & Krawiec, supra note 2, at 736 n.29.
They acknowledge that if both parties are investing, then favoring one party over the other
would exacerbate the holdup problem. See id. at 731. If, however, appropriable quasi-rents
always create mutual incentives to engage in opportunistic behavior, then favoring one
party over the other because one is making a specialized investment while the other has a
specialized need would also seem to exacerbate the problem. I will come back to this later.
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B. What Do Baker and Krawiec Mean by a “Relationship-Specific
Investment”?
As noted earlier, Baker and Krawiec propose a new RSI default
rule for contracts in which one party has made a specialized investment.27 In order to gain the benefits of the default, one party must
give notice that it is making or has made a specialized investment
which relates to the contract, and the other party must consent or at
least not object.28
If the default applies, then in any litigation between the parties—
including any dispute as to the interpretation of ambiguous language, the contents of an allegedly missing term, or the meaning of
the background obligation of good faith—the court should favor the
version proffered by the relationship-specific investor so long as it is
not absurd.29
If the concept of a relationship-specific investment is going to do
that much heavy lifting, it is essential to define it in a way that is intelligible to parties and courts. Without such a definition, the proposed default rule is unworkable and indeed could be pernicious.
The difficulty here is distinguishing a relationship-specific investment from an ordinary, “plain vanilla” investment. Every commercial contract is in some sense an investment, since it involves the
commitment of resources to a transaction or project with the expectation of a positive return on those resources.30 Further, because every
commitment of resources to one contract precludes their commitment
to alternative contracts,31 every commitment is in that sense contract
specific.
If the contract involves a long-term relationship, then every resource commitment is relationship specific, because the resources
were committed to that relationship rather than others. If the RSI
default is not intended to apply to every term of every contract under
the sun,32 then there must be some way of distinguishing a relationship-specific investment from these other investments.
27. Id. at 728.
28. Id. at 728, 736.
29. Id. passim. The default applies to every term of the contract, whether or not that
term is significantly related to the investment. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
30. It does not matter, for my purposes, whether parties correctly estimate the probability of gain and the associated risk. It merely matters that they expect to gain from
trading.
31. This is the familiar notion of opportunity cost. MARK SEIDENFELD, MICROECONOMIC
PREDICATES TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 21 (1996).
32. Or indeed every noncontract in which a party has invested something in the process of an unsuccessful attempt to form a contract. If that party gives notice of an investment—which may be quite informal—and the other party does not object, then the RSI default will supply the “missing terms,” even if those missing terms may be those essential to
formation. Baker & Krawiec, supra note 2, at 743 n.60.
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Baker and Krawiec recognize the difficulty and have given both a
general definition of an RSI and some examples of their rule in application.33 I applaud their attempt to give concrete guidance, but I do
not think they are successful in demarcating the line. The problem is
that although the general definition seems correct,34 their examples
either do not fall within it or involve contracts that do not and will
not exist.
I turn now to their examples of an RSI to see whether the relationship-specific investments they describe create appropriable
quasi-rents. If they do not, then there is no holdup power that needs
balancing, and the application of their default rule is at best unnecessary and at worst creates its own holdup potential.
III. THE RSI IN ACTION
A. Krantz v. BT Visual Images, L.L.C. 35
Steven Krantz was (and presumably still is) a small businessman
in Northern California.36 He sold videoconferencing systems, which
he assembled from various components.37 He obtained some—but by
no means all—of those components from BT38 pursuant to a formal
“reseller agreement.”39 The reseller agreement permitted Krantz to
buy components from BT at a wholesale price and to resell them to
his customers at a specified higher price.40 The agreement explicitly

33. Id. passim.
34. Baker and Krawiec never actually explicitly define a “relationship-specific investment” and therefore do not overtly connect it to specialization or customization. However, that connection is implicit in their statements that the RSI either loses significant
value or has no value if the parties do not continue to trade. See id. at 731, 735-36. It is
also implicit in their recognition that a contract for the sale of a fungible commodity does
not implicate the RSI. See id. at 751.
35. Krantz v. BT Visual Images, L.L.C., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 209, 211 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001).
36. Id. at 211.
37. Id. at 211-12.
38. Id. at 212. The BT group marketed British Telecom systems and equipment in
North America and offered maintenance contracts on those systems. Brief for Respondent
at 3-5, Krantz, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 209 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (No. A087341) (filed Oct. 19,
1999). Although Krantz was the appellant for purposes of the summary judgment, he was
the respondent in a consolidated appeal of a related matter; the trial court denied BT’s request for attorneys’ fees pursuant to California statute. Thus, Krantz’s opening brief is denominated a “respondent’s” brief, although a later “respondent’s” brief on the summary
judgment issues was filed by BT. The date of the filing is therefore included to distinguish
between them.
39. Krantz, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 211-12. He had apparently been buying components
from BT since 1993 but did not have a formal agreement prior to October 1994. See id. at
211.
40. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 38, at 18-19. The parties sometimes called
the difference the “product margin” and sometimes called it a “commission.” See id. at 19.
A securities lawyer would think of it as a “spread.”
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stated that Krantz would be an independent contractor and not BT’s
agent for the purpose of resales.41
One of Krantz’s videoconferencing customers was Kaiser Permanente, a nationwide health care provider in Oakland.42 Krantz’s relationship with Kaiser allowed him to acquire “know-how” in customizing systems for it.43
At some point in 1994, Kaiser decided to request proposals to supply twenty-four videoconferencing systems in Kansas City and Denver.44 According to Krantz, these systems were intended to be a “pilot
project” which, if successful, would then be installed nationwide.45
Krantz approached BT about teaming up to submit a bid on those
initial systems and, again according to Krantz, to continue to team
up on all subsequent Kaiser business if the pilot project succeeded
and Kaiser thereafter installed systems in all its other offices.46
Krantz alleged that the parties agreed to this ongoing teaming arrangement47 but did not agree on either the duration of the “team”
past the initial bid or the amount of the “product margin”48 Krantz
would get on any future, post-pilot project business.49 That was all to
be left to future negotiation.50 Nevertheless, according to Krantz, this
agreement created both an enforceable contract and a joint venture.51
41. See Krantz, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 218. Whether a particular distribution agreement
creates an agency or is a “mere” contract for resale is a recurring problem in agency law. In
this case, neither Krantz nor BT apparently sought to characterize the reseller agreement
as an agency relationship. I use the word “apparently” advisedly, however. Krantz did
claim that his relationship with BT eventually became a joint venture, id. at 218-19, which
(like all partnerships) creates mutual agency within the scope of the venture, but when or
how the alleged joint venture was formed is not clear from the opinion or the briefs.
42. See Krantz, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 212.
43. Some of that know-how was apparently obtained from a subcontractor. Id. As we
shall see, there is frequently a problem with assigning property rights in human capital. If
Krantz has some claim to the exclusive use of the Kaiser know-how, the subcontractor
would seem to have an equally strong claim.
44. See id. at 212.
45. Brief for Respondent, supra note 38, at 3-4.
46. Id.
47. Krantz, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 212. This agreement, if it existed at all, was not memorialized in any kind of writing. Id.
48. The product margin is sometimes referred to in the opinion as the “profit margin.”
Krantz, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 212. The difference between a “product margin,” as in a spread
or allowable commission, and a “profit” is quite important on the question whether the arrangement constituted a partnership, and the court’s conflation of the two is confusing.
BT’s petition for rehearing asked for clarification on this, but the court declined the request. Petition for Rehearing at 13-16, Krantz, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 209 (No. A087341).
49. Krantz, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 218. The missing margin term is sometimes referred
to as a missing “price” term. In this context, a missing price term and a missing margin
term are really the same thing. The margin, at least if expressed in absolute dollars rather
than percentages, would depend on the wholesale versus resale price of the components.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 217-20. BT denied the existence of any such agreement, but of course,
for purposes of summary judgment, whether it existed was a disputed question of fact. BT
therefore relied instead on various legal arguments that it was unenforceable, one of which
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Krantz then shared his know-how and his designs for a custom,
modular, Kaiser-friendly videoconferencing system with BT.52 Once
BT had obtained this valuable information, it was in a position to cut
Krantz out. It did not do so, or at least not right away, but it did present him with a written teaming agreement for the Kaiser pilot project bid which, he alleged, differed substantially from the previous
oral agreement.53 The most important difference was that the written
agreement omitted any mention of his participation in any future,
post-pilot project Kaiser business.54
The written agreement was presented on the eve of Kaiser’s deadline for proposals, and BT told Krantz that if he did not sign, it would
go it alone.55 At that point, he consulted an attorney and decided to
sign it rather than be cut out altogether.56 In the ensuing litigation,
he claimed duress.57
The BT-Krantz bid was successful, and so, apparently, was the pilot project.58 BT continued to do business with Kaiser, but without
Krantz.59 He sued, claiming, among other things, breach of contract
and breach of fiduciary duty.60 After protracted and acrimonious pretrial skirmishes, BT moved for summary judgment.61 BT argued,
among other things, that the alleged interim, oral agreement, which
was that it was merely an “agreement to agree” and therefore too indefinite to be enforced.
Id. at 218.
52. Id. at 212. There was apparently no confidentiality agreement, written or oral. See
id. at 211-13. Interestingly, Krantz did not claim a property interest in his custom designs
(or if he did, it is not intelligible from the briefs). He did, however, claim ownership of some
of the other information he gave BT. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 38, at 7-8. Because the custom configuration also relied on components from other suppliers, the bid required knowing the cost of those other components. See id. at 7. Krantz had that information; BT apparently did not. See id. Krantz shared that information with BT and later
claimed that it was his own “proprietary” information. Id.
53. Id. The written teaming agreement contained an integration clause. Petition for
Rehearing, supra note 48, at 8. BT relied heavily on this in its motion for summary judgment, essentially arguing that even if the previous oral agreement did exist, it had been
superseded by the written agreement. Id.
54. It did not, however, omit any terms as to his payment for the pilot project itself.
The court’s opinion suggests that BT was arguing that the written teaming agreement was
too indefinite to be enforced. Krantz, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 211, 217-18. In fact, however, BT
had already paid Krantz for his participation in the pilot project pursuant to the written
terms; one of its defenses to the allegation that it had breached the written teaming
agreement was that it had been fully performed. Id. at 218.
55. Brief for Respondent, supra note 38, at 7-8.
56. Id. at 8.
57. Krantz, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 218.
58. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 38, at 8-9.
59. See id. at 9-10.
60. The complaint contained thirteen causes of action. Id. at 10-11. The breach of contract claims apparently covered the reseller agreement, the interim oral agreement, and
the final teaming agreement. Krantz, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 217-19. The breach of fiduciary
duty claim was based on the “joint venture” allegedly created either by the interim agreement or the written “teaming” agreement or both. Id. at 219.
61. Id. at 213.
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Krantz conceded omitted future product margins and price terms,
was too indefinite to be enforced.62
The trial court agreed with BT and granted summary judgment
on all of Krantz’s claims.63 Krantz appealed, and the appellate court
reversed, ruling that dismissal was premature.64
The portion of the opinion of most interest to Baker and Krawiec
deals with BT’s argument that the oral “contract” was merely an
“agreement to agree” and therefore unenforceable.65 The appellate
court held that the missing terms did not render the agreement unenforceable as a matter of law.66 It did so in one short paragraph,
saying that the missing terms were “necessarily” indefinite because
it remained to be seen whether the joint proposal would be accepted,
and those terms were not essential elements of an agreement to
jointly prepare and submit a bid on Kaiser’s proposals, “dependent as
they were on the scope of Kaiser’s purchases, if any.”67
The agreement, assuming that it existed, was certainly highly
contingent; it depended on winning the bid for the pilot project, on
Kaiser’s evaluation of the pilot project’s success, and finally on Kaiser’s decision to use the Krantz-BT team for any future expansion of
the pilot project.68 However, Baker and Krawiec are surely correct
when they say that it is not clear that the necessary information on
future product and pricing margins was unavailable to the parties.69
Because the information was available but not included, the stan-

62. Id. at 217-18. As noted earlier, BT also denied that such an agreement existed,
but, of course, BT could not have obtained summary judgment based on that denial. See
supra note 51.
63. Krantz, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 213.
64. Id. at 217-20.
65. Id. at 218. This part of the opinion is also discussed in Robert E. Scott, A Theory of
Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1656-57 (2003).
66. Krantz, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 217-18.
67. Id. at 218. The court’s discussion is puzzling because it focuses on the written
teaming agreement, which was the contract for the joint submission of a bid on the “pilot
project.” Id. at 212-13, 217-18. BT never argued that agreement was too indefinite to be enforced; indeed, it argued that it had been fully performed. See id. at 218. The only “contract” urged to be indefinite was the alleged oral agreement to team on any post-pilot project business with Kaiser. Id. at 212-13, 217-18. That was the agreement that Krantz conceded said nothing about margins or prices. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 38, at 6.
Indeed, it is hard to imagine how the pilot project bid could have been submitted without
the parties having “costed” it, which means that they had to have addressed margins and
prices by the time the bid was submitted. Krantz apparently contended that the eventual
(written) pilot project agreement—allegedly signed under duress—differed from the previous (oral) agreement as to the margins and prices for that project, not that those terms
were missing from that oral agreement—at least as to the pilot project bid.
68. See Krantz, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 212-13.
69. Baker & Krawiec, supra note 2, at 741. Indeed, the parties could have negotiated a
percentage (as they in fact did for the written agreement) without knowing a dollar amount.
Krantz’s expert witness used just such a percentage in calculating his claimed damages for
his exclusion from that additional business.
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dard analysis of agreements to agree would have led the court to refuse to enforce the agreement.
Baker and Krawiec nevertheless maintain that the case was correctly decided because their RSI default would have reached the
same result.70 Krantz, they say, made a relationship-specific investment by sharing his expertise about Kaiser’s needs with BT; his investment was specific to the missing margin and price terms because
he would not have shared his expertise if he had thought BT would
use it for its own advantage, with no compensation to him.71 They
also say he gave the requisite notice by telling BT that he had developed this expertise through his relationship with Kaiser.72 Further,
they say, BT was fully aware that Krantz expected his expertisesharing to pay off in the form of a continued relationship.73 Thus,
they conclude, the missing terms should be supplied in the manner
most favorable to Krantz so long as Krantz can support his claim
with credible expert testimony.74
With all respect, if this is the lesson we are to draw from the case,
then I am going to flunk this course, and so, I am afraid, are a plethora of parties and judges. Here is the rub: Krantz “invested” a resource that he already owned.75 He developed that resource—his
know-how—because of his relationship with Kaiser, not because of
his relationship with BT.76 That know-how may very well have been
of value to BT, but it was not developed for and because of the contract with BT.77

70. Id. at 741-42.
71. Id. at 741.
72. Id. at 741-42. If that is sufficient notice, it is unclear to me how BT could possibly
have related it to the missing terms in the alleged contract. Further, if this is an RSI, then
what of BT’s investment in the components to be used? I presume BT’s edge over its competitors in this high-tech industry required ongoing investments in physical and human
capital. Krantz knew BT’s products were not fungible; he preferred BT components for
some purposes, although he used other components as well. Krantz, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
212. Did Krantz, therefore, have notice that BT was making a relationship-specific investment too?
73. Baker & Krawiec, supra note 2, at 741-42. This assumes, of course, that BT could
have understood this as a communication of an intent to make a specialized investment in
the first place—which in turn requires an intelligible definition of investment.
74. Id. at 742, 744 n.63.
75. I am assuming, for the moment, that he “owned”—had a property right in—the
know-how. As noted earlier, supra note 43, his subcontractor might also claim ownership,
and, of course, Kaiser was free to disclose information about its needs to other suppliers,
including BT.
76. See Krantz, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 212. Indeed, according to Krantz, BT asked him
to be an authorized reseller because of that preexisting relationship. Brief for Respondent,
supra note 38, at 5-6.
77. Baker and Krawiec observe that BT did not object to Krantz’s “notice” that he was
making an RSI, see Baker & Krawiec, supra note 2, at 741-42, but if the purpose of an objection is to prevent overinvestment, it was far too late for that. Krantz’s investment in
know-how was by that time a sunk cost.
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To see why that makes a difference, let us go back to Klein, Crawford and Alchian’s classic example of the printing press.78 A contracts
to manufacture and operate a customized press for B. Once the press
is manufactured and installed, both A and B have holdup power over
each other because they are mutually dependent.
Now suppose that B is struck by lightning, goes bankrupt, or otherwise disappears from the scene. B no longer has holdup power over
A, although that does not mean that A is a happy camper. A is now
stuck with the press and has to decide what to do with it. A might
enter into a contract to sell or lease it to C, who might be another
publisher or, for that matter, a scrap dealer. A is committing a resource—the press—to the contract with C, and A hopes to profit from
that commitment. Thus, A is, in some sense, investing in the contract. But A is not, repeat not, making a specialized investment with
respect to the contract with C.79 A is simply selling an existing asset
to the highest bidder.
I hope that by now it is obvious that if Krantz is A, the owner of
the asset in our hypothetical, then Kaiser, not BT, is B, the party for
whom the asset was custom-manufactured. Krantz “invested” in
learning about Kaiser’s specialized needs in order to do business with
Kaiser. If Kaiser decided to use someone else for its videoconferencing systems—which Kaiser was free to do, since it did not have a
long-term contract with Krantz—then Krantz would lose the value of
that investment. Kaiser therefore had some holdup power in the relationship.80
But Krantz’s beef is not with Kaiser, it is with BT. So, if Kaiser is B
in the hypothetical, who is BT? The answer is that BT is C, the
party—think second publisher or scrap dealer—to whom Krantz tried
to sell his preexisting asset. The Cs of the world may behave badly, but
their power to do so is not a result of specialized investment.
What gave BT the power to (allegedly) behave badly in the contracting process was the nature of Krantz’s asset. Know-how is a form
of human capital. Some of it is acquired by doing and is, therefore, not
78. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
79. If C is another publisher to whom A decides to lease the press, and C requires
some custom modifications to meet C’s needs, then the cost of the modifications would be a
specialized investment. However, C would not have holdup power—or at least not more
holdup power than any contracting party has—as to the original investment made because
of A’s relationship with B. Those costs are sunk.
80. Krantz’s investment in learning about those needs might serve as a barrier to entry by another competitor, giving him an advantage which would make it less easy for Kaiser to switch to someone else. Thus, if Kaiser had some holdup power over him, he could
have had some over Kaiser. Kaiser, however, was perfectly willing to open up its pilot project to competitive bids. Krantz, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 212. This suggests that Krantz’s
know-how was not very valuable to Kaiser, who could easily communicate its needs to another provider.
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easily transferable to a novice purchaser. Some of it takes the form of
information that can be used by anyone. Krantz’s knowledge about
Kaiser and his system designs fall into the latter category.
Valuable information is an odd kind of property; the process of
transferring it can destroy its value to the prospective seller. Information wants to be free—or at least the law wants information to be
free unless its status as property is very carefully protected.81 Krantz
gave BT his information and designs without a confidentiality
agreement.82 If he did so before any contract had been formed, then
he is the victim of a self-inflicted wound.83 If he did so after an enforceable agreement had been reached, then he is a justifiably aggrieved plaintiff in an ordinary contract action. Under either scenario, however, he is not someone who made a specialized investment because of his relationship with BT.
B. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp.84
This case involved a requirements contract under which Gulf Oil
agreed to supply Eastern’s aviation fuel requirements at certain airports.85 When the price of crude oil rose dramatically in the early
1970s, the contract price was lower than the market value of the fuel.86
According to Baker and Krawiec, Eastern responded to the price differential by “fuel freighting”—that is, by taking on more fuel than it
needed at Gulf-serviced airports in order to avoid paying higher prices
at non-Gulf airports, thus manipulating its requirements.87
81. I do not propose to wade further into the murky waters of intellectual property here.
82. Perhaps Baker and Krawiec’s real concern is that BT did not warn Krantz that he
should protect himself with a confidentiality agreement. In that case, Krantz’s “RSI notice”
would trigger the contractual version of a Miranda warning: You have the right not to give
away valuable information, and if you give it away, we can use it without compensating
you.
Parties to commercial contracts are not, however, usually required to explain the law
to each other, and Baker and Krawiec do not explain why that kind of information sharing
should be forced through a default rule. Indeed, using a default rule to correct ignorance
about the law would seem to undercut the basic premise of the default rules literature:
parties are rational actors who can predict legal outcomes and adjust their behavior accordingly.
83. At least from the perspective of contract law. Krantz also alleged that his agreement with BT was joint venture, which is a species of partnership. Krantz, 107 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 212. Partnership law can yield a different result, depending on whether the jurisdiction operates under the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) or the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA). Under the UPA, fiduciary duties—including the duty not to appropriate
information—exist during the negotiation period preceding the formation of a partnership,
UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 21 (1914); under RUPA, fiduciary duties do not commence until the
partnership is formed. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404 (1997). At the time in question,
California was a UPA state.
84. 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
85. Id. at 434-35.
86. See id. at 433.
87. Baker & Krawiec, supra note 2, at 745-46.
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Gulf tried to renegotiate the contract price for its fuel, but Eastern
refused.88 According to Baker and Krawiec, Gulf was locked in to its
relationship with Eastern because it had built a new refinery and
needed to continue to trade with Eastern; it had no readily available
alternative customer.89 The new refinery was, or may have been, a relationship-specific investment and—had the RSI default existed at
the time of the case—a court would have used it to rule that Eastern’s conduct was not in good faith.90 Knowing that Gulf would win if
it came to litigation, the airline would have renegotiated the price.91
There are two problems with this account of the case. The first is
that it does not comport with the facts. Gulf did not build the refinery
so that it could supply Eastern,92 and Eastern did not dramatically increase its requirements to take advantage of the price differential.93
The second problem is that the refinery investment did not create
quasi-rents that could be appropriated by Eastern. Aviation fuel is
not a customized product; Gulf’s fuel was fungible with that produced
by other suppliers. If it were not, Eastern could not have fuel
freighted. Further, refineries are not usually limited to one type of
fuel. Gulf wanted out of its contract with Eastern precisely because it
could get a higher price for its refinery products elsewhere.94 In short,
the Eastern-Gulf contract involved a standardized product with a
readily available market alternative. Eastern could not hold up Gulf,
88. Eastern Air Lines, 415 F. Supp. at 431-32.
89. Baker & Krawiec, supra note 2, at 746.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Baker and Krawiec state that it is not clear from the facts of the case whether the
refinery was built specifically to fit the needs of Eastern. Id. I agree that the opinion is
muddled at best. However, as Victor Goldberg has noted, the court’s reference to the refinery as the reason for the contract “cannot be right. The claim that requirements contracts
were widely used by other refineries and were used by Gulf at other refineries and at earlier times is inconsistent with this explanation.” Victor P. Goldberg, Discretion in LongTerm Open Quantity Contracts: Reining in Good Faith, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 319, 334
(2002). Indeed, Gulf would have been crazy to build a refinery just for Eastern. Eastern
bought only ten percent of its total fuel requirements from Gulf, id. at 333, and the refinery came online when the most recent contract between them had only one year to go. See
Eastern Air Lines, 415 F. Supp. at 432.
93. Id. at 335 (“[T]he variation in quantity appears to have been rather modest.”).
This is not surprising; Eastern could not suddenly change its routes or its schedule. It was
in business to be an airline, not a fuel jobber.
Gulf’s real problem was that the escalator clause in the contract, which provided a
variable price depending on the price of crude, did not anticipate that the government
would impose a new form of price control and that the published price would not reflect the
“real” price of crude. See Eastern Air Lines, 415 F. Supp. at 439-40. Gulf wanted the escalator clause rewritten to correct the disconnect between the published price and reality. See
id. at 431-32, 439-40. The court was unsympathetic; it held that the language was not ambiguous, noting that it was Gulf’s form contract and Gulf had chosen the pricing measure.
See id. at 432, 439.
94. See Eastern Air Lines, 415 F. Supp. at 441 (noting Gulf Oil’s “rational desire to
maximize its profits”).
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and there is no reason to apply a default rule that would change the
outcome of the case.95
Although Gulf’s refinery did not involve a specialized investment,
there are other contracts that do. For example, how would the RSI
default work in commercial leases? Baker and Krawiec do not attempt to answer this question. Nevertheless, commercial leases present the claimed virtues (and potential vices) of the RSI default in a
useful real-world context and are therefore worth exploring.
Commercial leases come in a variety of flavors, ranging from
“build to suit” to bare walls. Their terms are intensively negotiated.
A tenant’s relationship-specific investment in supplying the interior
(for a bare walls lease) or a landlord’s relationship-specific investment in building to suit will presumably be reflected in those negotiated terms and will take into account the fact that a customized interior may increase the value of the premises to the landlord when the
tenant leaves—but may also decrease the value if the landlord must
remove or rearrange the interior in order to lease to a new tenant.
Commercial leases, particularly in shared spaces like malls, usually assign the landlord considerable control over the tenants’ activities. The landlord’s exercise of that control is subject to the implied
condition of good faith, as is the landlord’s discretion to renew the
lease, to permit subleasing, or to evict for cause.
How would the RSI default affect commercial landlord-tenant disputes about the landlord’s exercise of control or discretion? The answer appears to be that the landlord would win in a “build to suit”
lease, and the tenant would win in a bare walls lease—assuming, of
course, that the counterparty had not objected to the invocation of
the default when the lease was negotiated.
It is not at all clear that this result is allocationally efficient.
Consider the bare walls tenant who intends to invest in a customized
interior. If Baker and Krawiec are correct, the RSI default would encourage this investment by permitting the landlord to credibly commit not to hold up the tenant while simultaneously discouraging

95. Baker and Krawiec suggest that even if the refinery itself was not a specialized
investment, other facts might have been developed to demonstrate that Gulf had made a
specific investment in its relationship with Eastern. For example, they say, Gulf might
have trained its workforce to work on Eastern jets or located fueling stations at Eastern
hubs. Baker & Krawiec, supra note 2, at 747. However, unless Eastern was operating nonstandard jets, or no other airlines were using the hub airports, any such investments
would not have specialized.
Indeed, if either party in this relationship was vulnerable, it was Eastern. The opinion
does not say whether other sources of aviation fuel were available at those particular airports. That does not, however, require the invention of a default rule to protect Eastern. It
could have (and indeed may have) entered into standby contracts with alternative suppliers.
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overinvestment by giving the landlord an incentive to monitor the
level of the tenant’s expenditure.
The landlord, however, is not in a particularly good position to observe the appropriate level of investment for any given tenant. If the
landlord were an expert in running the various businesses on the
leased premises, it would operate them itself.96
Further, if customized interiors produce an appropriable quasirent, that may be exactly why the parties chose the sort of lease that
required them. A tenant’s specialized investment may be a bonding
expenditure designed to permit the tenant to credibly commit not to
hold up the landlord.
Commercial leases, at least when the premises are shared with
other tenants, produce a “double moral hazard” problem. While the
possibility of a landlord holdup should theoretically lower the rent,
the landlord’s ability to control the tenants and the tenant mix can
actually increase rents. All tenants benefit when the landlord maintains the overall quality of a mall or any other shared commercial
premises. That benefit can be captured in the form of higher rents
than would otherwise obtain in a low-quality environment. Whether
assigning discretion to the landlord actually lowers rents depends in
part on the market’s assessment of the relative likelihood of bad
landlord behavior versus bad tenant behavior.
One bad tenant can reduce the communal value of high-quality
premises. A tenant who is leaving has no continuing interest in mall
quality. If, for example, the lease were freely assignable, a departing
tenant would have an incentive to hold up the landlord (or the other
tenants) by threatening to sublease to a low-quality tenant. That
threat is (or at least may be) more likely than a landlord’s threat to
hold up a departing tenant by refusing consent to sublease to a highquality tenant. The landlord is a repeat player whose investments in
reputation and sustained profitability make it less likely that the
consent provision will be used solely to hold up one tenant than that
a departing tenant will use free transferability to hold up the landlord.
Thus, assigning discretion to the landlord can increase the value
of commercial leases generally. Specialized investment by tenants
can also increase the value of commercial leases because it reduces
any given tenant’s incentives to hold up the landlord.
The problem with the RSI default in this situation is that it fails
to recognize that the very existence of the rule reduces the tenant’s
ability to use specialized investment as a commitment device. Fur96. The same dynamic is at work in franchise arrangements. If the franchisor could
operate the component businesses itself, it would not franchise. Much of my analysis here
of the role of specialized investment in commercial leases builds on Klick, Kobayashi, and
Ribstein’s work on opportunism in franchising agreements. See Klick et al., supra note 13.
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ther, since the default would favor the landlord in a “build to suit”
lease, it would reduce the value of the landlord’s investment in reputation as a bonding expenditure if there are other tenants who would
later pay a higher rent for that particular configuration.97
I suspect that the net result of the RSI default for commercial
leases would be that landlords and tenants would routinely waive its
dubious protections in order to preserve their own carefully crafted
balancing of the costs and benefits of specialized investment. In any
event, I wish Baker and Krawiec had focused their considerable talents on “good faith” in contracts that actually involve such investments rather than on implausible hypotheticals—which leads me to
their next example.
C. A Hypothetical Requirements Contract
Baker and Krawiec posit a requirements contract with no specified quantity range.98 After the contract is signed, the seller makes “a
substantial investment in targeting its production to the buyer’s
needs,” and the buyer does not object.99 Later, in an attempt to lower
the price, the buyer claims that it requires very little of the product.100 The seller’s investment triggers the RSI default rule, although
perhaps merely in order to flip the burden of proof on the buyer’s
good faith.101
It is not clear whether this “targeted” production means that the
resulting product is so specialized that no one else will buy it. If the
product is not customized, there is no appropriable quasi-rent. Further, the hypothetical does not explain why the buyer can so easily
make a credible threat to do without it, given that the reciprocal of
the seller’s specialized investment is the buyer’s specialized need.
The holdup power would be mutual and the buyer would be vulnerable too—yet the RSI default would increase the seller’s rebargaining power at the expense of the buyer.
Baker and Krawiec do not have a supporting case for their hypothetical, which is not surprising. Requirements contracts with a
missing quantity term are a null set. In any event, if the hypothetical
seller did not protect itself with a “take or pay” clause, payment in
advance, or any of a number of other available contractual devices,
then we have another case of a party whose managers are either
crazy or closely related to potted plants—and businesses run by such

97. In such a situation, of course, the landlord’s specialized investment would not create an appropriable quasi-rent.
98. Baker & Krawiec, supra note 2, at 747-48.
99. Id. at 748.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 749.
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people are unlikely to have the wherewithal to make substantial investments in targeted production.
D. Raffles v. Wichelhaus102
Baker and Krawiec’s final example of a relationship specific investment is based on the classic case of the good ships Peerless.103 A
buyer and seller contracted for the sale of cotton to be transported on
a ship named “Peerless.”104 As it happened, two ships of the same
name plied the Bombay to London route, one arriving in October, the
other in December.105 The seller shipped on the December Peerless,
and the buyer refused to accept delivery because it was not the October Peerless.106 The court held that the mistake as to the ship name
meant there was no contract.107
Baker and Krawiec suggest that a modern court should ask
whether either party has made a relationship-specific investment in
the cotton contract and given the necessary notice.108 If one has, then
that party’s interpretation of Peerless should win.109
I have no idea what form of relationship-specific investment the
authors have in mind, but unless it results in customized cotton with
no readily available alternative market, there is no quasi-rent to appropriate. I have a very hard time imagining modern parties who are
capable of bioengineering cotton and using it in a way valuable to no
one else, but are nevertheless incapable of particularizing the shipping method, using a tracking number (or a global positioning
transmitter on the container), or electronically communicating a
shipping confirmation. I suspect that, once again, such parties do not
exist.
IV. CONCLUSION
Without an intelligible definition of a relationship-specific investment, I cannot tell whether the RSI default would solve or even ameliorate the holdup problem created by appropriable quasi-rents. Even with
an intelligible definition, the fact that the default operates only on behalf of the party making the investment would be deeply troubling,
since it ignores the bilateral dependency created by the relationship.

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

(1864) 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Exch. Div.).
Baker & Krawiec, supra note 2, at 750.
Raffles, 159 Eng. Rep. at 375.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 376.
Baker & Krawiec, supra note 2, at 750-51.
Id.
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I am also generally skeptical about the apparent assumption in
much of the default rules literature that courts can do a better job of
protecting the economic interests of the parties than the parties
themselves can.110 I am therefore dubious about the claimed benefits
of the RSI default. I can, however, briefly sketch some of its more obvious costs.
First, I can foresee a cottage industry in litigating whether a
claimed RSI is really relationship specific and whether the notice was
in any event sufficient.111 The costs of enforcement are real costs and
ought not to be lightly increased. The costs of legal error are real costs
too, and—at the risk of impermissible academic hubris—I do wonder
how an overburdened state court judge is supposed to distinguish between relationship-specific investments that create holdup power, relationship-specific investments that do not create holdup power, ordinary reliance expenditures, and the mere commitment of resources—
when some very talented law professors and economists cannot.112
Second, if an RSI notice given during the negotiation period is
enough to convert a not-yet-contract into a contract, it may deter a
valuable negotiating technique, the agreement to agree.113 That, in
turn, would result in less, not more, efficient contracting.
Third, the RSI default may reduce the utility of specialized investment as a bonding mechanism, particularly in situations of double
moral hazard like franchising and commercial shopping center leases.
Finally, if the RSI default applies to the acquisition and dissemination of information, it permits the party possessing the information to evade the generally understood mechanisms for protecting intellectual property. Confidentiality agreements, to which both sides
must agree, will be augmented and perhaps replaced by a unilateral
claim of specialized investment. It is possible that those who specialize in intellectual property law would consider this a good thing, but
I doubt it.

110. In this, I am at least in good company. In addition to the previously cited work of
Eric Posner, supra note 12, and Victor Goldberg, supra note 92, see Alan Schwartz &
Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541 (2003).
111. This is likely even if parties do not engage in strategic notification and confine
themselves to good faith claims. If no one can be sure what an RSI is and if benefits flow
from invoking the default rule, then anything that could plausibly be an RSI will be called
one. Of course, it is also possible that routine notice will be followed by routine objection, in
which case the default rule would enrich the purveyors of paper and ink without producing
any other discernible costs or benefits.
112. One has only to recall the persistent dispute over the reasons for the GM-Fisher
Body acquisition, supra note 19, to get a sense of the problem.
113. The fact that such an agreement is not enforceable does not make it useless. See
Omri Ben-Shahar, “Agreeing to Disagree”: Filling Gaps in Deliberately Incomplete Contracts, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 389, and the authorities cited therein.
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In short, there is a very real question whether the RSI default, intelligibly defined, would reduce the costs of contracting within the
sphere in which it will operate without producing other, even higher
costs. At best, the answer must be a definite “maybe” and at worst, a
resonant “no.”

